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Abstract 
This article is according to the characteristics of the industrial development in Fujian province. First, we set an 
evolution game model. Second, we use the mechanism that industrial innovation promotes structural optimization of 
industry to analyze how industrial innovation promotes industrial structural optimization. Then we combine the 
model deduced before with the realistic development situation of the industry to test and verify. We thereby obtain 
some attributes and characteristics of the industrial development in Fujian province, and then we will also analyze 
and explain about these attributes and characteristics. On the base of the analysis and explain before, we finally come 
up with policy suggestions about industrial innovation for industrial structural optimization. 
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1. Introduction 
Since reform and opening up, economic growth has continued over 30 years, and the economic 
construction of Fujian province has made great achievements. During more than twenty years, the 
economy in Fu jian keeps growing as fast as 10% over a long period. But the worries are hidden behind the 
great achievements. Resources tend to be exhausted because of long-term immoderate exp loitat ion, and 
industrial division is lying in the low end of international division for a long time. A ll these problems are 
related to the extensive economic growth pattern that our country relies on energy, minerals and labor 
resources, and the key to solve these problem is industrial innovation.. 
2. The basic theory and basic model 
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2.1. The effect analysis model of innovative policy for industrial innovation: evolution game theory 
2.1.1. Evolution game in replicator dynamic mechanism 
Investigate an evolution game. The number o f pure strategies every gamer can choose is i (i=1,2,…,n). 
The game is repeated during a period of t  (t=1, 2…). Set  
i
tP  as the proportion of the gamers using 
strategy iS . The payoff of strategy iS  is 
i
tS = iS ( tP ). We label the strategies so as to make 
t
1S d t2S d… tnS .Set tijP  as the probability of those gamers who first adopted iS  and then turn to jS . 
t
ijP  are decided by the following formula: 
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Here, E  is a number which is small enough to make ijP d 1 for all i, j. The expected value of the 
probability that gamers adopt iS  in the period of t+dt is shown as 
dti
iEP

, and: 
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Here, 
t_S = tt P11S +…+ tntn PS  represents the average payoff of the whole group. Minus itP  from both 
sides of the equation, then divided by dt. When dt approaches 0, we get the following formula: 
* ( )t t t ti i iP P PDE S   i=1,2…,n  (1) 
We call formula (1) replicator dynamic equation, and we may suppose DE =1.  
2.1.2. The evolution game model of industrial innovation in replicator dynamic mechanism 
2.1.2.1. The hypothesis of the model 
x The enterprise’s scales are all the same. 
x The group is very large in scale, that is to say, the number of the gamers approaches infinity. 
x Every gamer can only use pure strategy: innovative strategy or conservative strategy. 
x The payoff of innovative strategy is greater than conservative strategy.  
Supposing that an industry consists of n enterprises (n approaches infinity). Pairwise enterprises repeat 
confrontations in random matching. Each enterprise can use innovative strategy 1S or conservative 
strategy 2S . It’s shown as Fig.1. If the two enterprises both use conservative strategy, they divide the 
payoff of 2v (v > 0) equally. If they both use innovative strategy, they divide the payoff of 2u (2u>2v > 0) 
equally, also, they had to bear the cost of innovative working: c. If one uses innovative strategy while the 
other uses conservative strategy, the one using innovative strategy gain s 2u-c+ c0 while the other gains v. 
 
Fig. 1. Matrix representation of random matching game on industrial innovation 
We presume 12
tP  as the probability of those gamers who first adopted 1S  and than turn to 2S . 
Supposing that the proportion of those enterprises who take strategy 
1S  among all the enterprises is x. 
Because n approaches infin ity, x may be regarded as a continuous variable. According to the replicator 
dynamic equation (1), we get: 
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2.1.2.2. The equilibrium analysis of the model 
The equilibrium point of the evolution game model under replicator dynamic mechanism is in the 
place where f (x) = 0. Solve the equation, and we get x=0, 1, (2u-c-v)/u. 
According to replicator dynamic linear theory we see that it will be stabilized when f ' (x* ) <0, on the 
contrary, when f ' (x * )>0, it won’t be stabilized. As we can’t judge the stability when f ' (x * ) =0, we 
discuss it by using the character of f(x) and then we will get Table 1 shown below. 
Table 1. The evolution equilibrium of industrial innovation replicator evolution system 
 (2u-c-v)/u 0d  0<(2u-c-v)/u<1 (2u-c-v)/u 1t  
Evolution equilibrium x=0 x=(2u-c-v)/u x=1 
Game equilibrium (conservative, 
conservative) 
(innovative, conservative), (conservative, innovative) 
And innovate with the probability of x=(2u-c-v)/u 
(innovative, 
innovative) 
2.2. The mechanism of industrial innovation for industrial structural adjustment 
Innovation has changed the production function. The direct result of p roduction function’s change 
reflects the rearrangement of the resources and the optimizat ion, upgrade and transformation of the 
industrial structure, and the final result is to promote the development of the economy. The mechanis m is 
shown as Fig. 2: 
 
 
Fig. 2. The mechanism of industrial innovation for industrial structural optimization 
3. The empirical analysis of industrial innovation and industrial structure in Fujian province 
3.1.  The analyze of the effect on industrial innovation by the government ’s supply policy 
Presume an industry is constituted by n enterprises (n approaches infinity). In this industry, supposing 
that the government reduces innovative cost c0 by supply policy. Pairwise enterprises repeat 
confrontations in random matching. Each enterprise can use innovative management S1 or conservative 
management S2. By analyzing we get Fig.3 shown below: 
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Fig. 3. Random matching game of industrial innovation under supply policy 
So we come to this system’s replicator dynamic equation:  > @01 (2 )dx x x u c c v uxdt      
 
There are  three anchors: x=0, 1, (2u-c+c 0 -v)/u. Through the analysis, we work out the industrial 
innovation’s evolution equilibrium shown as Table 2: 
Table 2 Industrial innovation’s evolution equilibrium 
 (2u-c+ c0-v)/u 0d  0<(2u-c+ c0-v)/u<1 (2u-c+c0-v)/u 1t  
Evolution equilibrium x=0 x=(2u-c+ c0-v)/u x=1 
 
By analyzing Table 1, we can find that if we want to make the innovation succeeded, we need to make 
2u-c-v>0. So  (c+v)/2 can be regarded as a critical value. If the innovative payoff is lower than the crit ical 
value, the industrial innovation will be a failure; otherwise the industrial innovation will succeed. After 
the government takes the supply policy into effect, the cost will reduce to c-c0. At this time, the crit ical 
value also correspondingly decrease to (c-c0+v)/2. Some innovative payoff may  be lower than the crit ical 
value (c+v)/2 before the government intervention and then may be higher than (c-c0+v)/2 after 
government intervention. In popular words, the government supply policy reduces the “threshold” of 
industrial innovative success. So it has an effect on encouraging innovative strategy adopted throughout 
the industry. In other words, it encourages industrial innovation. 
3.2. The analysis of industrial innovation for industrial structural optimization 
We will analyze the embodiment of industrial innovation during industrial transformat ion of Fujian 
province from four aspects. 
3.2.1. Industrial innovation is the foundation of traditional industries’ transformation and upgrade and 
new industries’ formation. 
On one hand, the traditional industries are great advantages of Fujian, and the key to keeping the 
advantages is to use high and new technology to transform and upgrade the competit iveness of traditional 
industries. On the other hand, industrial innovation is the main factor o f accelerating the format ion of new 
industries. Innovation will lead a certain industrial market demand become saturated and industrial 
development may stagnate. Also, innovation can prompt new industries’ formation by technology-driven 
and demand towing. 
3.2.2. Technological innovation is the key to enhancing the industrial core competitive power and 
transform the industrial current development model 
Relying on technological innovation is the key to cultivating the enterprise’s core competitive power, 
and changing the current extensive and high cost industrial development pattern, reducing the adverse 
effect of high dependence on foreign trade and foreign technology on economic development. If an 
industry wants to keep developing, scientific and technological innovation is necessary. 
3.2.3. Industrial innovation is a requirement of extending the industrial lifecycle 
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In Fu jian p rovince, many industries are faced with the phenomenon of short industrial lifecycle. For 
the industries consisted of enterprise groups, Technology in different stages of industrial lifecycle affects 
the industrial development through working on the relevant factors among different enterprise groups. 
The improvement of the products’ performance and the reduction of the cost caused by technological 
innovation will expand production demand, so as to extend the product s’ golden cycle. 
3.2.4. Technological innovation is the core of industrial structural optimization 
Technological innovation adjusts the industrial structure through affecting demand structure and 
supply structure. A new technology can make the production cost reduced and the demand increased, and 
it can also make consumer goods and consumer demand structure upgraded. The direct result of 
technological innovation is the improvement of social labour productivity. This will promote industrial 
division to deepen and new industries to appear, and the industrial structure will constantly optimize and 
upgrade. 
4.  Further explanation of the conclusion 
The analysis above shows that the competition between enterprises can not always make innovation a 
success in the entire industry. Therefore, government’s appropriate intervention is necessary. For a 
successful intervention of the government, the following several tasks remains to be done: 
x The subject localization of industrial innovation for Fujian industrial optimization.  
x The system arrangement of industrial innovation for Fujian industrial optimization. 
x Adopt market-oriented operation pattern and structure the industrial innovative system which consist 
of officer, production, study and research. 
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